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ABSTRACT: This article analyzes Australia’s contribution to the
Afghanistan War from 2001 to 2014. It recommends policymakers
and practitioners consider applying a whole-of-government
approach, embedding personnel in coalition headquarters, and
limiting reliance on Special Forces soldiers in future interventions.

A

survey of Australia’s broader contribution to the Afghanistan
War highlights the complex considerations of a coalition
partner in a “war of choice” fought in an area geographically
distant from its immediate region of strategic interest. By examining
the many facets of Operation Slipper, Australia’s military engagement
in Afghanistan, three key lessons emerge that will help policymakers
and practitioners avoid past mistakes and build on programs that serve
Australia’s national interests.
When facing similar conflict scenarios, Australia should consider
the following: the need to look beyond the provision of security and
consider a whole-of-government (interagency) and development
approach from the outset; the reputational and experiential benefits
accrued by selectively embedding Australian personnel in coalition
headquarters; and the inherent hazards that accompany an overreliance
on Special Forces.

Australia’s War in Afghanistan: An Overview

The Australian public knows little of Australia’s contribution to the
war in Afghanistan. Few would be aware that between 2001 and 2014,
more than 25,000 Australians served in, or in support of, Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), which made the nation the ninth largest supporter of
the effort.1 Moreover, Australia was the largest non-NATO contributor
to ISAF.2 The war cost Australia AUD$8.3 billion.3 Tragically, 41
Australians were killed, and through January 2013, there had been

1      David Horner, “The Emerging Strategic Environment,” in On Ops: Lessons and Challenges for
the Australian Army since East Timor, ed. Tom Frame and Albert Palazzo (Sydney: University of New
South Wales Press, 2016), 49.
2      Michael G. Smith, “Australian Civil-Military Lessons from Afghanistan,” in Australia and
Canada in Afghanistan: Perspectives on a Mission, ed. Jack Cunningham and William Maley (Toronto:
Dundurn, 2015), 151.
3      Peter Hall, “The Cost of the War in Afghanistan,” in Cunningham and Maley, Australia and
Canada, 119.
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249 physically wounded.4 The full extent of psychological injuries is
unknown. But the numbers are clearly higher still, and suicide among
discharged veterans is a growing problem.5
The decades following the Vietnam War are known within
Australian defense circles as “the long years of peace.” 6 In the absence of
any major threat to Australia’s national security interests, the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) kept busy with exercises and niche contributions
to international peacekeeping missions.7 But in reality, exercises only
provided so much training, and peacekeeping contributions involved
only small numbers of ADF personnel.
By the early 1990s, as one commentator has written, an entire
generation of “officers and soldiers had not seen any form of operational
service.” 8 The East Timor crisis of 1999—the largest deployment of
ADF personnel since Vietnam—changed that. Since then, the ADF has
been “involved in almost continuous military operations.” 9 Afghanistan
was but one of many.10
Operation Slipper, the name given to the ADF’s contribution to
operations in Afghanistan, is perhaps best understood if separated into
four periods (see figure 1). The first, 2001–2, covered the initial response
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The second, 2005–6,
saw Australia’s return to the war, this time with Special Forces in
Uruzgan province. In the third, 2006–10, Australia was part of the
Dutch-led Task Force Uruzgan, and in the fourth, 2010–14, Australia
was part of the American-led, and later took leadership of, Combined
Team Uruzgan.
From 2001 to 2006, Australia contributed forces as part of OEF.
But the majority of Australia’s Afghanistan experience from 2006 to
2014 was under ISAF’s banner and centered on Uruzgan. Australia’s
main contributions were by way of ground forces. But as figure 1 shows,
numerous other elements, notably naval assets; rotary and fixed-wing
aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics; and a
bevy of Australian officers embedded in coalition headquarters worked
in support of Australian and coalition forces. These contributions were
spread throughout Afghanistan and the greater Middle East.

4      Australian Department of Defense (DoD), “Vale,” DoD, accessed November 7, 2019.
5      Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (IHW), National Suicide Monitoring of Serving and
Ex-Serving Australian Defence Force Personnel: 2018 Update (Canberra: IHW, 2018).
6      Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 34.
7      “Official History of Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post–Cold War Operations,” Australian
War Memorial, accessed November 7, 2019; John Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to
Howard (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2014); and David Horner, ed., Official History of
Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations, 6 vols. (Melbourne: Cambridge
University Press, 2019).
8      Tom Frame, “Lessons and Learning,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops, 3.
9      Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 33.
10      Frame, “Lessons and Learning,” 1.

TOC

Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part II

Crawley

51

Figure 1. Operation Slipper11
11     Dr. Steven Bullard, Australian War Memorial
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Australia’s 25th prime minister, John Howard, was in Washington,
DC, on 9/11, having met President George W. Bush for the first time
the day before.12 The impact of the terrorist attacks on Howard was
profound. Almost immediately, from a bunker in the basement of the
Australian embassy on Massachusetts Avenue, he announced Australia
“will stand by [the United States], we will help them, and we will support
actions they take to properly retaliate in relation to these acts of bastardry
against their citizens and against what they stand for.” 13
Howard knew that in all likelihood Australia would be going to
war in support of her great and powerful friend. His government soon
invoked the mutual defense clauses of the ANZUS Treaty (1951) between
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States as a practical show of its
“steadfast commitment to work with the United States in combating
international terrorism.” 14 Australia’s strategic objectives in contributing
to the war on terror were twofold—help defeat al-Qaeda and make a
down payment on the US-Australia alliance.15
Before long, Australia had committed military personnel to support
the war in Afghanistan. These came from each of the ADF’s three
services—the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Army, and the Royal
Australian Air Force. But the main role, and certainly the one that
provided the most visible and significant contribution, was Australia’s
Special Forces Task Force.16 Between October 2001 and December
2002, three rotations of predominantly Special Air Service Regiment
troops—each numbering some 200 personnel—worked alongside their
US counterparts in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
The task force was involved in some firefights, notably Operation
Anaconda. The main strength of the task force to OEF, however, was its
ability to undertake self-sustaining, long-range reconnaissance patrols,
some lasting for weeks, while liaising with and observing local Afghans.
The intelligence they gathered informed coalition plans and guided
coalition air support onto targets.17 The government never intended
for a long-term Special Forces commitment and brought the troops
home in late 2002. Until 2005, Australia maintained a small footprint in
Afghanistan—usually one, sometimes two, officers.18 Significantly, and
no less controversially, during this period Australia joined the United
States, Britain, and Poland in the invasion of Iraq.19
12      John Howard, Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography (Sydney: HarperCollins,
2011), chap. 31.
13      Howard, Lazarus Rising, 382.
14      John Howard, “Application of ANZUS Treaty to Terrorist Attacks on the United States,”
Parliament of Australia press release, September 14, 2001.
15      Karen Middleton, An Unwinnable War: Australia in Afghanistan (Melbourne: Melbourne
University Publishing, 2011), 38.
16      Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 43.
17      Middleton, Unwinnable, 58–66.
18      Nicole Brangwin and Ann Rann, Australia’s Military Involvement in Afghanistan since 2001: A
Chronology (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2010).
19      Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army and the War in Iraq, 2002–2010 (Canberra: Directorate of
Army Research and Analysis).
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After a break, the ADF returned to Afghanistan in late August 2005.
As before, the Howard government chose to send Special Forces in the
form of a Special Forces Task Group (SFTG) consisting of elements
from the Special Air Service Regiment and commandos from the 4th
Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (Commando).20 Working within a
US Special Forces construct, their operations focused on Uruzgan and
Daykundi provinces in central southern Afghanistan.21
The strategic rationale for Australia’s involvement was similar to that
offered in 2001—Howard favored an in-and-out approach, that is, the
SFTG would return to Australia after 12 months.22 Throughout those 12
months, three rotations of approximately 200 personnel were engaged
in a myriad of tasks—long-range, vehicle-mounted reconnaissance;
security patrols; direct action assaults; clearance operations; and civic
action programs. It was a busy time operationally and intellectually as
the SFTG attempted to both understand and close with the enemy—
known at the time as the “anti-coalition militia.” 23
On schedule, although not without debate about whether it was
the right move, the SFTG returned home in September 2006.24 That
12 months represented the highest intensity of combat and prolonged
battlefield stress faced by the ADF since Vietnam. In the eyes of senior
ADF leaders, it set the conditions for Task Force Uruzgan to begin its
work in Uruzgan province as part of the ISAF Stage 3 expansion into
Regional Command South.25
In addition to the SFTG, in early 2006, Australia also committed
two of the army’s CH-47D Chinook helicopters to the coalition pool
in Kandahar. Initially these were largely confined to logistic support.
But as time progressed, the helicopters were configured and approved
for combat missions. Significantly, both Chinooks were involved in a
joint Canadian-Australian direct action assault in July 2006, which saw
the Chinooks insert and extract the Canadians under extremely heavy
fire.26 Australia maintained its Chinook deployments on and off for the
remainder of the war.27
When the Australian government announced its intention to deploy
the SFTG, it also told the public it was looking at the possibilities of
contributing to an ISAF-led provincial reconstruction team.28 After some
delay, it settled on partnering with the Dutch as part of the Dutch-led
20      John Howard, “Press Conference Parliament House, Canberra,” transcript ID 21821, Prime
Minister and Cabinet, July 13, 2005.
21      Steven Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan 2001–13,” Wartime 64 (Spring 2013): 17.
22      Howard, “Press Conference.”
23      Chris Masters, No Front Line: Australia’s Special Forces at War in Afghanistan (Sydney: Allen &
Unwin, 2017), chaps. 5–7.
24      Angus Houston, “SOCAUST Media Briefing Post Op Slipper,” Australian Department of
Defence transcript no. MECC 60927/06, Parliament of Australia, September 27, 2006.
25      Houston, “SOCAUST Media Briefing.”
26       Bernd Horn, No Ordinary Men: Special Operations Forces Missions in Afghanistan (Toronto:
Dundurn, 2016), chap. 5.
27      Brangwin and Rann, Australia’s Military Involvement.
28      Howard, “Press Conference.”
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task force in Uruzgan. As noted earlier, this saw a shift in Australia’s
commitment from OEF to ISAF.
The deployment of a 400-strong reconstruction task force (RTF)
also marked a shift in Howard’s preferred strategic concept of deploying
Special Forces for a short, defined mission and then withdrawing them
before they got involved in peacekeeping, stabilization, and nation
building.29 Howard’s actions revealed he realized Afghanistan would not
be a quick fight.30 Indeed, the RTF was the first of what would amount
to 13 conventional Australian task forces to Uruzgan.31
Between August 2006 and October 2008, Australia sent four RTF
rotations to Uruzgan.32 The RTFs were engineer heavy, with a significant
force-protection element, and were increasingly employing combined
arms theory and practice. Over the course of more than two years, the
RTF, in the words of its first commanding officer, “worked to rebuild
the physical infrastructure of Uruzgan province, to build an indigenous
capacity to undertake engineering activities there.” 33 The latter was
achieved through a trade training school which focused on providing
carpentry skills to Afghan youth.34
On top of its own work, the RTF was ultimately in Uruzgan “to
support the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team.” 35 It was, in essence,
an effort to win “hearts and minds” and thus turn people away from the
insurgency.36 From the start, the RTF concept of operations was to take
a “top down, bottom up” approach by rebuilding government infrastructure
as well as doing small-scale missions requested by villages.37 The projects,
which included the construction of schools, bridges, health facilities,
and patrol bases, grew in size and scope. In 2008, the RTF briefly left
Uruzgan to work on higher coalition construction priorities in Zabul
province.38
During May 2007, a Special Operations Task Group of 300 soldiers
returned to Uruzgan. Australia had wanted it to operate as part of OEF.
The Netherlands insisted otherwise. Australia relented; the 17 task group
rotations through the end of the war were therefore part of ISAF’s effort
and reported to ISAF special operations forces headquarters rather than
Task Force Uruzgan (ISAF special operations forces were commanded
on a rotational basis by British and Australian officers).39 The troops in
29      Hugh White, “Why Australia Needs a Much Bigger Army,” The Age, July 20, 2005.
30      White, “Why Australia.”
31      Gareth Rice, “What Did We Learn from the War in Afghanistan?,” Australian Army Journal
11, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 7.
32      Brangwin and Rann, Australia’s Military Involvement.
33       Mick Ryan, “The Other Side of the COIN: Reconstruction Operations in Southern
Afghanistan,” Australian Army Journal 4, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 126.
34      Ryan, “Other Side,” 134.
35      Ryan, “Other Side,” 126.
36      Ryan, “Other Side,” 126.
37      Ryan, “Other Side,” 130 (italics in original).
38      Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan,” 18; and Stuart Yeaman, Afghan Sun: Defence, Diplomacy,
Development and the Taliban (Brisbane: Boolarong, 2013).
39      Middleton, Unwinnable, 185.
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the task group, most of whom did multiple tours, “carried the burden
of taking the fight to the Taliban . . . by targeting key leaders, insurgent
compounds, weapons caches, bomb-making facilities, and drug-related
criminal elements.” 40
By 2008, Australia had a new government. At his first meeting of the
National Security Committee of Cabinet, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
asked the ADF’s senior leaders for an explanation of Australia’s strategy
in Afghanistan. At first he “was met with blank looks.” 41 Eventually, it
emerged that since 2001, Australia’s strategy, as Rudd understood the
situation from conversations with the Chief of the Defence Force, “had
largely been a matter of honouring our alliance obligations and going
where the Americans thought we could make the best contribution, given
the type and size of our military resources.” 42 Rudd said Australia had
to find a better reason to be in Afghanistan than just keeping the United
States happy.43 His government then commenced a strategic review but
held off implementing its findings until the Obama administration made
its intentions clear.44
The combination of Rudd’s desire to do something different and the
coalition’s adoption of a counterinsurgency strategy caused a slight shift
in Australia’s focus. In October 2008, a mentoring and reconstruction
task force replaced the RTF. Over two rotations, the task force continued
with its reconstruction tasks.
Based on an infantry battalion rather than engineer regiment,
however, the task force shifted its—and therefore Australia’s—main
effort from reconstruction to mentoring an Afghan National Army
(ANA) kandak (battalion). It did this through an operational mentoring
and liaison team.45 The second rotation grew in size and responsibilities—
thus allowing it to mentor more ANA units and to provide combat
power in support of the 2009 elections. As such, the overall numbers of
ADF personnel in country increased to more than 1,500 (see figure 2).46
Australia’s efforts and focus underwent another shift in February
2010. Five rotations of the newly named mentoring task force (MTF)
focused solely on advising and developing the capacity of 4th Brigade,
ANA. Drawing on the experiences of the mentoring and reconstruction
task force, the MTF maintained an aggressive patrolling program, living
and working from patrol bases that now dotted Uruzgan’s landscape.
The added emphasis on mentoring saw Australian forces, along with
their Afghan partner units, push into parts of Uruzgan province that
hitherto had been the responsibility of Dutch and French operational
mentoring and liaison teams. This was especially the case from August
40      Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan,” 18.
41      Kevin Rudd, The PM Years (Sydney: Macmillan, 2018), 12.
42      Rudd, PM Years, 13.
43      Rudd, PM Years.
44      Rudd, PM Years, 139.
45      Bullard, “Australia in Afghanistan,” 19; and Peter Connolly, Counterinsurgency in Uruzgan 2009,
Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Papers no. 321 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2011).
46      Connolly, Counterinsurgency, 8; and Horner, “Emerging Strategic Environment,” 47.
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1, 2010, when the Dutch handed responsibility for Uruzgan to the
United States.
The United States commanded the newly named Combined Team
Uruzgan until Australia assumed that responsibility in late 2012.47 From
the perspective of one of its commanding officers, the MTF “sought
simply to get the Afghan Army to weaken the insurgents such that the
people would be left with no alternative but to collaborate with the
agencies of the Afghan Government.” 48 It did this by maintaining a
persistent presence in insurgent-controlled or insurgent-contested
areas, thus reducing insurgent freedom of movement, and by extension,
aiming to convince the population that Afghan government dominance
was inevitable.49 Of course, such efforts were designed to fulfill the
security pillar of ISAF’s campaign plan; governance and development
were mostly left to others.

Figure 2. Authorized ADF troop strength in Afghanistan50

Like the coalition more broadly, throughout this period the Australian
government was firmly focused on getting out of Afghanistan. Its exit
strategy was predicated on two factors: transitioning responsibility of
local security to Afghan forces and sticking to the coalition timetable
of 2014. An end date rather than end state would determine when
Australia’s job was done. In this regard, though, Australia was cautious
to set an end date before other coalition partners had shown their hand.
In line with its aims and appetite for risk, Australia gradually
shifted its focus from mentoring to advising. This was especially the
case when green-on-blue attacks increased the threat to ADF personnel
47      Nathan Church, Australia at War in Afghanistan: Updated Facts and Figures, Research Paper Series
2013–14 (Canberra: Parliament of Australia, December 13, 2013).
48      The Commanding Officer of an Australian Battle Group in Afghanistan in 2011,
“Commanding Officer’s Observations: Mentoring Task Force Three,” Military Operations 2, no. 2
(Spring 2014): 5.
49      Commanding Officer, “Commanding Officer’s Observations.”
50      Data collected by the Australian War Memorial.

TOC

Afghanistan’s Lessons: Part II

Crawley

57

living and working with their ANA counterparts. Australia also
assumed responsibility for the local provincial reconstruction team,
thus improving the whole-of-government presence on the ground and
allowing for a greater focus on capacity building.51 In December 2013,
the last Australians left Uruzgan. About 400 personnel remained in
training and support roles in Kandahar and Kabul.52 Today, around 300
Australians are still training, advising, and assisting in Afghanistan as
part of the Resolute Support Mission.53
In assessing Australia’s contribution in Afghanistan, the first point
to keep in mind is unlike the commitment of a brigade-size task force
and ownership of a province in Vietnam, Australia deployed small
elements as part of a larger coalition force. The fact the ADF was a
small cog in a larger coalition machine is an important piece of context
when examining Australia’s war in Afghanistan.
There was no Australian concentration of force in Afghanistan—no
Australian fast jets or artillery supported ADF elements on the ground
in Uruzgan. For this and more, Australia relied on coalition partners.
Instead, the ADF filled niche roles that reflected Australia’s appetite for
risk and its wider strategic priorities.54 As one commentator has written,
Australia’s participation was “carefully calibrated,” with successive
Australian governments balancing their aversion to casualties with the
reality that Afghanistan is not in Australia’s strategic area of interest.55
Next, most of Australia’s operational experience in Afghanistan
was at the platoon level or lower. The fact the ADF, and especially the
Australian Army, “had lost foundational war fighting skills at anything
above sub unit level,” was not lost on some in the ADF senior
leadership.56 Since at least 2004, elements of the ADF have recognized
the importance of and attempted to alleviate the potential of being
unprepared for the future by changing the structure of the army to
create all-arms brigades and to improve the force-generation cycle to
ensure the army can sustain long-term operations.57
Despite all of this, the high operating tempo in places such as
Afghanistan, has led to the ADF becoming “a far more sharp-edged
force” than the one that existed when the East Timor crisis hit in 1999.58
Whether or not Australia’s presence and contribution made a difference
or was worth the costs is open to debate. The answers vary depending
on who is asked and at what level of war the question is directed.
51      Church, Australia at War, 14.
52      Emma Griffiths, “Australian Soldiers Complete Withdrawal from Afghanistan’s Uruzgan
Province,” ABC News, updated December 16, 2013.
53      “Global Operations Afghanistan: Operation Highroad,” DoD, accessed November 7, 2019.
54      John Blaxland, “The Army and Government Objectives,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops, 283.
55      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 283.
56      Lieutenant General David Morrison, Chief of Army, quoted in Luke Carroll, “ ‘Steward of
the Profession’: Making Generals,” in The Battles Before: Case Studies of Australian Army Leadership after
the Vietnam War, ed. David Connery (Newport, Australia: Big Sky, 2016), 78.
57      Major General Ken Gillespie (later Lieutenant General, Chief of Army) “The Challenges
Facing a Land Commander,” Australian Army Journal 1, vol. 2 (Winter 2004): 51–60.
58      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 290.
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Admittedly, it is difficult to balance the achievements of the past with
news of Taliban gains and continued fighting in 2019.59

Lessons

“It is only through rapid adaptation that a military organisation
can keep pace with an adversary who is also evolving. Plainly, both
combatants seek an advantage over the other,” wrote Albert Palazzo.60
“To defer lesson learning,” he continued, “risks losing the contest for
ideas.” 61 At the tactical level, the ADF had various mechanisms to
identify and to disseminate lessons from Afghanistan, sometimes before
the next rotation deployed.62
The primary aim of these short-term lesson loops was to prepare
soldiers and subunits for what they might face on operations: adaptation
in tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as equipment.63 There is a
chance the niche nature of Australia’s contribution means the ADF did
not learn the right lessons or its lessons were incomplete.64 There is also
the reality that the wrong lessons might be drawn from a war that did
not feature enemy air power, artillery, counterintelligence capabilities,
high-end equipment, or cyberwarfare.
Nonetheless, the processes for identifying lessons at the tactical
level were not matched at the operational, strategic, administrative, or
institutional levels. No formal reviews, for instance, were conducted on
these aspects until after Australian forces had left Uruzgan.65 Senior
practitioners and military institutions should revisit, and not repeat,
this approach lest they lose the contest of ideas or forget those lessons
encountered and insights from the “longest war.” 66 The above survey,
as well as work undertaken to date for the Official History of Australian
Operations in Afghanistan, identifies three key lessons that deserve further
consideration before Australia next finds itself as a junior partner in a
coalition counterinsurgency effort.

Lesson One: Consider a Whole-of-Government Approach from
the Start

The truism that military action alone would not bring stability
or security to Afghanistan was not lost on those planning Australia’s
contribution.67 When it came to deploying civilians, however, the
59       Bill Roggio, “US Military Downplays District Control as Taliban Gains Ground in
Afghanistan,” Long War Journal, January 31, 2019.
60      Albert Palazzo, “Postscript,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops, 301.
61      Palazzo, “Postscript.”
62      Palazzo, “Postscript,” 285–86.
63      Palazzo, “Postscript,” 303.
64      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 3.
65      Palazzo, “Postscript,” 299, 307; and “Army Institutional Lessons Study,” Australian Army,
September 7, 2016.
66      Richard D. Hooker and Joseph J. Collins, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015); and several articles in Parameters 49, no.
3 (Autumn 2019).
67      Frame, “Lessons and Learning,” 6.
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Howard government decided it was too dangerous, preferring instead
to leave nation-building work to other entities, such as the United
Nations, nongovernmental organizations, or the Dutch. This should
not downplay the significance of Australia’s aid donations, which
totaled over AUD$1.2 billion.68 But Australia’s war in Afghanistan was
dominated by the military, which carried the burden both in funds and
risks. Australian diplomats, development experts, and civilian police
were not seen in any meaningful numbers until after the Dutch departed
Uruzgan in 2010.
The lessons to be learned from Australia’s experience, as well as
those of the coalition in general, are numerous. First, if Canberra really
wants to make a difference on the ground, it needs a greater interagency
commitment as soon as the security situation permits. Moreover, it
needs to be willing to take outright responsibility for more than the
security pillar of a counterinsurgency campaign. It should ensure
better multiagency cooperation and the integration of the whole-ofgovernment efforts with those of coalition partners, and it needs to
resource the commitment appropriately.69 By the time these realities were
implemented in Afghanistan, Australia was already working toward its
exit strategy of transitioning responsibility to Afghan authorities.

Lesson Two: Maintain a Selective Embed Program

A defining feature of Australia’s war was the visibility and
effectiveness of its embedded officers in coalition headquarters across
OEF and ISAF. Anecdotally, it was not unusual to have an Australian in
ISAF headquarters briefing another Australian in Regional Command
South, both speaking with the weight of their respective coalition
commanding generals. American General Stanley McChrystal had
Australians spread throughout his headquarters. A two-star general was
his senior military adviser to the Afghan defense minister. A one-star
general coordinated the ISAF security response for the 2009 Afghan
elections. And another one-star general was a senior intelligence officer.70
Being a non-NATO member, Australia was able to bypass the flagsto-task ratios and take a strategic approach to select where it placed
its well-trained, highly proficient officers. Consequently, the ADF’s
leadership focused on getting people into positions that increased
Australia’s exposure to high-level decision-making and theater operations
and then keeping an Australian in those jobs so long as it suited national
interests. This program also benefited those individuals, exposing them
to significant coalition machinations, personalities, and pressures.
These few well-placed people often were more visible than the
hundreds of troops in Uruzgan. Several coalition generals have spoken in
surprise about Australia’s successes in this regard and have commented
68      Church, Australia at War.
69       Australian Civil-Military Center, Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government
Mission, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2016).
70      John Faulkner, “Australian Appointed as the Senior Military Advisor to the Afghanistan
Defence Minister,” Parliament of Australia, February 26, 2010.
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they wished they would replicate that access. Notably, they have also
invariably praised those officers.71 It was a deliberate policy, enabled
because of Australia’s historic links with the Five Eyes intelligence
partnership countries that dominated Regional Command South and
ISAF Headquarters, as well as the performance of those individuals.
This selective embed program delivered huge benefits to Australia.
Aside from exposing a generation of senior officers to coalition warfare
at the operational and strategic levels, it allowed Australia to have a say
in shaping the war at the tactical level without having to deploy too
many people, expend large sums of money, or put people unnecessarily
in harm’s way.72 It delivered strategic bang for the buck, allowing the
ADF to meet the government’s objective of supporting the United
States without undue risk. The lesson, therefore, is Australia, leaning on
the reputation it has gained in Afghanistan, as well as its access to Five
Eyes intelligence material, should continue to maintain a highly targeted
program of embedded officers.
Australia must be careful, however, not to develop a reputation for
contributing embeds at the expense of boots on the ground. In Iraq,
for example, the ADF was criticized for having a highly capable battle
group with restrictive rules of engagement. Such an approach did not
win Australia any favors among its coalition counterparts.73 The Iraq
example shows that a successful embed program has to be paired with
adequately sized forces engaged in operations, with few caveats. It mostly
achieved this in Afghanistan. Tied to lesson one, Australia should aim
to expand its embed program outside military channels, to include more
civilians, and to use the exposure and the experience gained to engender
a greater whole-of-government approach on the ground.

Lesson Three: Be Careful of Overreliance on Special Forces

As noted earlier, Special Forces were the force of choice for Howard.
He saw in them less risk, less cost, and greater flexibility. Undoubtedly
their smaller footprint, perceived lower casualty rates, high operations
security, and familiarity with coalition Special Forces, appeals to riskaverse governments, especially those embarking in wars of choice, as
opposed to wars of necessity.74
It is no surprise then that Howard used them to spearhead his
commitments to Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and Afghanistan
again in 2005. Recent media reports of cultural issues within the Special
Operations Command and an ongoing inquiry by the Inspector-General
of the ADF into alleged war crimes committed by Special Forces soldiers
in Afghanistan, however, suggest successive governments may have
overused, and even misused, Australia’s Special Forces.
71      Interviews conducted by the author.
72      M. A. Thompson, “An embedded staff officer in Afghanistan: observations from ‘the engine
room’,” Australian Defence Force Journal 196 (2015): 41–43.
73      Jim Hammett, “We Were Soldiers Once . . . The Decline of the Royal Australian Infantry
Corps?,” Australian Army Journal 5, no. 1 (Autumn 2008): 44–45.
74      Blaxland, “Army and Government Objectives,” 291.
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By 2004, it was apparent to the Chief of Army Lieutenant General
Peter Leahy that “too much of the burden” during recent operations was
falling on a small portion of the ADF, in particular the Special Forces.75
Their operating tempo was high, their wider responsibilities (which
included domestic counterterrorism) equally taxing, and their numbers
finite. Yet in 2005, they were again sent to Afghanistan. As discussed
above, with the exception of a brief period during 2006 and 2007 when
the ADF’s senior leadership had been convinced they needed a rest, the
Special Forces were constantly deployed in Uruzgan for the remainder
of the war. Twenty Special Forces deployments between 2005 and 2014
largely fell to the Special Air Service Regiment and what became 2nd
Commando Regiment. The bulk of two deployments were undertaken
by the Army Reserve-heavy 1st Commando Regiment.
It is not uncommon to hear of these soldiers doing more than half a
dozen tours.76 The implications of multiple deployments to a high-stress,
high-threat environment, with the attendant constant exposure to the
horrors of war, for those soldiers and their families is another theme that
appears to be under investigation at the moment. Only time will tell.
Like concerns about overuse, the view that Special Forces were
misused in Afghanistan is not new. Indeed, a 2008 article in the
Australian Army Journal complained that rather than reserving Special
Forces for missions of strategic importance, the ADF was using them in
conventional infantry missions with tactical outcomes.77 The result was
deep frustration within the wider Australian Army, especially among
the ranks of the infantry, that the infantry was seen as “a distant second
choice for combat operations behind the Special Operations Forces.” 78
This frustration could also be felt among Dutch and Australian
commanders who, despite owning the area of operations and being
accountable for the success of the mission inside it, were rarely consulted
and often unaware of what the Special Forces were doing. Such a lack
of cooperation is worrisome when one considers the Special Operations
Task Group’s main purpose was to create and to maintain conditions
that allowed Task Force Uruzgan, and its Australian component, to
perform its functions. Lastly, there is also the fact of stress and pressure
on the units of Special Operations Command. It is evident some of
the overuse discussed above could have been avoided if more of these
combat missions had been given to the broader army.
It would be foolish to think the Special Forces will not be one of
the first options governments consider whenever war is on the table. It
would also be incorrect to conclude there was no place for Australian
Special Forces in Afghanistan. Many tasks they performed were
appropriate, such as long-range reconnaissance, clandestine operations,
75      David Beaumont, “Logistics and the Failure to Modernise,” in Frame and Palazzo, On Ops,
152.
76      Masters, No Front Line.
77      Hammett, “We Were Soldiers,” 41.
78      Hammett, “We Were Soldiers,” 40.
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and intelligence-led precision targeting against significant insurgent
leaders. There is also the reality that in the world of special operations
forces, elite units tend to want to work solely alongside of and share
information with other elite units.79 Despite these factors, the lessons
for the government and their ADF advisers should be to pause and
consider long-term ramifications for elite units and the wider Australian
Defence Force before committing Special Forces to war. It should also
ask whether Special Forces are the right choice for the task required.

Conclusion

A short article like this cannot do justice to the complicated and
nuanced story of Australia’s contribution to the Afghanistan War. It
can, however, provide readers with a contextualized account of that
commitment and present insights into coalition partner considerations
in a war of choice. It has also not attempted to identify or discuss all of
the many lessons stemming from that experience. Indeed, the Official
History of Australian Operations in Afghanistan, currently being written with
access to classified records, will have nearly one million words to canvass
such issues across political, strategic, operational, tactical, institutional,
and interagency divides.
That historical project, however, is still many years from completion.80
Awaiting its detailed analysis before attempting to identify lessons,
adapt, and implement change, accordingly risks, as Albert Palazzo
wrote, deferring institutional learning and losing the contest for ideas.
Yet this is precisely what has happened within the Australian Defence
Force above the tactical level. This reality provides the first lesson for
Australia: it must actively implement formal mechanisms to capture the
lessons of Afghanistan and adapt at all levels and across all arms of
government. It cannot afford to have those lessons confined solely to
the realm of informal corporate knowledge, where it risks evaporating
as senior public servants and military officers retire.
By focusing on three key lessons arising from Australia’s war in
Afghanistan, this article has provided a starting point for Australian
policymakers and practitioners. Afghanistan highlighted the importance
of development and governance to any counterinsurgency effort.
Consideration, therefore, should be given to implementing a wholeof-government strategy—paired with an interagency effort on the
ground—early in any future Australian commitment.
So, too, should policymakers and military practitioners realize
the benefits that accrue from a highly selective embed program. Such
a strategy should be maintained in times of peace and war. It must,
however, be balanced against the needs and wants of coalition partners,

79      Ian Langford, “Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan: Supporting Australia in the ‘Long
War’,” Australian Army Journal 7, no. 1 (Autumn 2010): 24–25.
80      “Official Histories–Iraq, Afghanistan & East Timor,” Australian War Memorial, accessed
November 7, 2019.
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Australian national interests, and the propensity to deploy embeds at the
expense of—rather than in addition to—ground forces.
Finally, careful thought should be given to the government’s default
position that Special Forces are the force of choice for such missions.
The constant rotation of ADF Special Forces units through Afghanistan
invariably strained a finite, strategic asset. Greater consideration should
therefore be given to the institutional and individual impact of deploying
Special Forces when another force element might suffice. This is as true
for preserving the capabilities of the Special Operations Command as it
is for developing those of the wider Australian Defence Force.
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